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Agency capture is a little like the weather: everybody complains about 
it, but nobody does anything about it.  It’s not hard to see why.  Once capture 
becomes an entrenched feature of agency culture, it can be difficult to uproot.  
By definition, the political dynamic will reflect an unappealing mix of well-
organized, well-heeled interest groups and a relatively apathetic and 
disinterested public.  Efforts by Congress or the Executive Branch to 
eliminate capture are unlikely to pay political dividends and will probably 
antagonize powerful interest groups.  Complacency seems the better 
course—for everyone but the public at large. 
The resistance of capture to political correction suggests that the most 
effective way to address capture will be to create conditions in which it is 
unlikely to flourish.  On that front, Rachel Barkow has made an exceedingly 
important contribution.1  She has provided nothing less than an instruction 
manual for conscientious legislators who, when grasping the rare political 
opportunity to create or reshape an agency, aim to insulate that agency from 
undue interest-group pressure.  And she has done so by moving the debate 
over insulation away from its myopic focus on formal independence from 
presidential control to the on-the-ground bureaucratic conditions that 
profoundly affect agency decisionmaking. 
 
  *   Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.  I wish to thank Rachel Barkow, 
Kristina Daugirdas, David Fontana, Scott Hershovitz, Nina Mendelson, Sallyanne Payton, and 
Ricky Revesz for their thoughts and feedback. 
1. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 
TEXAS L. REV. 15 (2010). 
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But Barkow’s piece leaves largely unanswered the problem of what to 
do with an agency that has already been captured.  Although nothing in 
principle prevents Congress from reshaping existing agencies along the lines 
she suggests, experience suggests that we might wait a very long time for 
Congress to enact structural reforms.  After all, what’s in it for Congress?  
Voters are unlikely to appreciate or care very much if Congress overhauls 
agency structure, and groups with a vested interest in sustaining capture 
would immediately marshal their resources to defeat such reforms.  Most of 
the time, structural reform will be a political nonstarter. 
 Worse still, even the most conscientiously designed agency can 
sometimes be captured.  (As does Barkow, I use the word “capture” as 
shorthand for the phenomenon whereby regulated entities wield their 
superior organizational capacities to secure favorable agency outcomes at the 
expense of the diffuse public.2  So understood, capture is a regulatory 
manifestation of public choice theory.3)  Barkow herself recognizes that none 
of her suggestions, taken alone or together, is a panacea.  After all, they 
diminish not one whit the incentives of well-organized interest groups to try 
to capture the agencies that regulate them.  And while these groups will have 
a harder time capturing a well-defended agency—well, even Troy was 
eventually sacked. 
So what is to be done about a captured agency?  As I will explain 
below, the political branches need two things to eliminate capture: good 
information and political will.  They need information in order to establish 
whether capture has taken hold, to understand the contours of the relevant 
capture dynamic, and to suggest agency-specific strategies for ameliorating 
capture.  More significantly, the political branches also need the will to 
implement those strategies even in the face of stiff resistance from well-
funded groups with a potent interest in perpetuating the status quo. 
Both information and political will are, however, in short supply.  They 
need not be.  As I will explain, Congress can and should establish a body 
housed within the Executive Branch and vested with the authority to 
investigate allegations of capture and document the existence of capture 
dynamics where they arise.  Adequately funded and appropriately staffed, 
this body would coordinate with offices of inspectors general across the 
federal bureaucracy to identify capture where it occurs.  At the same time, 
Congress should create legislative mechanisms to spur action on the 
recommendations of this newly instituted body. 
 
2. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–92 (2006) (providing a brief intellectual history of capture 
theory); Barkow, supra note 1, at 21, n.23. 
3. For a terse discussion of the contours of modern public choice theory, see JERRY L. 
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 
10–21 (1997). 
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The hope is that these regulatory reforms would work as a kind of 
agency hygiene—a routine and modestly uncomfortable process designed to 
forestall the development of a much more serious problem.  Properly 
implemented, this sort of oversight would neatly complement Barkow’s 
much-needed suggestions for structural reform. 
I. Information 
After seven people were killed in the September 9, 2010 explosion of a 
natural-gas pipeline in California, the diligence of the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) was—yet again—
called into question.4  Over the past decade, reports from the Government 
Accountability Office5 and the Congressional Research Service6 have 
consistently raised concerns about the capacity of PHMSA to ensure the 
safety of oil and gas pipelines.  These concerns are not trivial: over the past 
five years, accidents involving pipelines have killed 60 people, injured 230, 
and inflicted millions of dollars in property damage.7 
So has PHMSA been captured?  It’s certainly possible.  Where the 
energy industry is relatively well organized and highly motivated, the public 
is generally uninterested in questions about the safety of oil and gas 
pipelines.  (Who, after all, has even heard of PHMSA?)  Given these 
representational imbalances, the agency’s lackluster performance could very 
well be the product of capture. 
But capture is by no means the only explanation or even the most likely 
one.8  It is also possible that the agency has been derelict in carrying out its 
responsibilities because it lacks the regulatory authority to pursue violators or 
because its resources are stretched too thin.  (Careful, though: the lack of 
authority and resources may—or may not—be a function of the way that 
imbalanced interest-group pressures play out in Congress.)  Or maybe 
PHMSA is staffed by incompetents.  Or maybe the agency isn’t deficient at 
all, and we tolerate the occasional explosion of oil and gas pipelines because 
the costs of eliminating them would be prohibitive.  Looking closer, the 
 
4. Andrew W. Lehren, Millions of Miles of Pipe, and Years of Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2010, at A1. 
5. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-801, PIPELINE SAFETY: 
MANAGEMENT OF THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY’S ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM NEEDS FURTHER 
STRENGTHENING 13 (2004). 
6. See, e.g., PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33347, PIPELINE SAFETY AND 
SECURITY: FEDERAL PROGRAMS 15–16 (2008). 
7. See Lehren, supra note 4, at A1. 
8. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 344 (1986) (“Capture is not by any means the norm, and where capture occurs, it does 
not always last.”); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 31–
32, 177 (1981) (testing incentives related to capture theory at four federal agencies and finding it 
wanting).  
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problem grows even more complex.  In practice, PHMSA concentrates its 
inspection duties on those pipelines that cross state lines and depends on state 
regulatory agencies to police the safety of intrastate pipelines.9  Focusing 
only on PHMSA thus misses a significant aspect of the problem: maybe the 
agency resists capture but nonetheless finds its best efforts undermined by 
state agencies that are themselves captured. 
Diagnosing capture at PHMSA would thus require good information, 
and a lot of it.  The problem is not unique to this agency.  To reliably identify 
capture, we first need to know what an interest group has done to pull the 
levers of influence at an agency (regulatory inputs).  Although the industry–
agency contacts will occasionally be inappropriate enough to suggest 
untoward influence, most of the time they will involve altogether innocuous 
meetings, phone calls, and emails.  So we also have to examine what the 
agency has done (regulatory outputs).  Has it declined to exercise its 
enforcement authority?  Has it watered down regulations at industry’s 
behest?  Has it foregone regulating altogether?  Even if it has, that is still not 
enough.  The agency might have had good reasons for doing what it did.  The 
crucial inquiry remains: would the agency have more zealously performed its 
duties in the absence of undue pressure from regulated interests? 
That’s a hard question to answer.  Isolating the various factors that 
shaped a particular agency decision is hard enough.  Showing that the one 
that made a difference was the result of pressure from regulated entities is 
another matter altogether.  (The problem is similar to trying to figure out 
whether political donations have corrupted a legislator.  Money sometimes 
buys influence, but it’s difficult in all but the most blatant cases to know for 
sure when it does.)  The point is not that capture is impossible to identify.  
Sometimes it’s blatant.  But most of the time capture will be much harder to 
ferret out. 
Part of the trouble is that agency capture is less a discrete regulatory 
pathology than a complex of problems.  The schematic of the iron triangle 
suggested by George Stigler10 has long since given way to “more subtle 
explanations of industry orientation.”11  And although these explanations rest 
on the shared insight that regulated entities will generally have enormous 
organizational advantages over the dispersed public in advocating for their 
preferred regulatory outcomes, they otherwise have little in common.  
Agencies are denominated “captured” (or, if you prefer, “dominated”12) 
 
9. See 49 U.S.C. § 60105(a) (2006). 
10. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
3, 3 (1971) (arguing that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit”). 
11. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1685–86 (1975). 
12. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999). 
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when they depend too much on the industries they regulate for information, 
political support, or guidance;13 when the “revolving door” between agency 
and industry allows industry groups to influence agency appointments and 
tempt regulators with benefits;14 when industry effectively leverages its 
influence with those elected officials responsible for overseeing the agency;15 
and so on and so forth.  The moral is that capture can take hold in myriad 
ways.16 
The adaptability of capture theory suggests that careless application of 
the capture label can obscure rather than illuminate the bureaucratic 
dynamics that lead to capture.  That, in turn, can complicate efforts to craft a 
remedy.  Compounding the problem is a tacit but persistent misconception 
that arises in part from our choice of language.  When we say an agency is 
“captured,” we suggest that the agency has been thoroughly tamed and is 
beholden in all important respects to well-organized interests.  This in turn 
suggests that all other agencies ably resist interest-group pressures.  But there 
can be no binary sorting of agencies as “captured” or “not captured.”  
Agencies are almost never the unthinking pawns of organized interests; by 
the same token, rarely are they immune from interest-group influence.17  
Capture is a question of degree. 
Nor does capture always announce itself boldly.  Sometimes it does: 
outright bribery, although rare, is one means by which regulated entities 
might capture an agency.18  More commonly, however, agencies can 
participate in a capture dynamic even when they act in good faith to carry out 
their assigned missions.  A diligent agency might find itself overwhelmed if 
regulated entities have pressured legislators to slash its funding.  Or the 
agency might sensibly avoid tackling a controversial problem because 
drawing the ire of influential senators or congressmen would distract from 
other priorities.  Or the agency might depend on information from the 
affected entities and lack the means or ability to review that information 
skeptically.  Or the agency might come to see the world the way that its 
regulated entities do.  From the agency’s perspective, interest-group capture 
 
13. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1285. 
14. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 8, at 342. 
15. Barkow, supra note 1, at 22. 
16. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 8, at 341 (“Just as there is no single theory of the 
origins of regulatory capture, there is no single explanation of how capture is perpetuated.”). 
17. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor 
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 271–72 (1987) (observing that regulatory regimes 
necessarily benefit some groups, and that those groups will normally “attempt to sustain or even 
improve these beneficial results”). 
18. Cf. Philip Shabecoff, Jury in E.P.A. Case Finds Lavelle Guilty of Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
2, 1983, at A1 (recounting the criminal conviction of an EPA administrator for impeding 
Congressional investigations into hazardous waste programs). 
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is just one aspect of the (often inhospitable) regulatory milieu in which it 
operates.19 
The bottom line is that capture is subtle and can manifest in very 
different ways at different federal agencies.  Because properly tailored 
solutions depend on a clear-eyed understanding of the capture dynamic at 
work at a particular agency, robust information about whether an agency has 
been captured—and, if so, how—is essential.  As it stands, however, no 
institutional body is well positioned to undertake the sorts of investigations 
that would unearth this kind of fine-grained, contextual information.  Those 
that come closest—the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 
various offices of the inspector general—have serious limitations. 
GAO is the investigative arm of Congress, and it has a solid reputation 
for high-quality, non-partisan investigative work.  It even sometimes 
documents the shortcomings of agencies (like the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC), for example20) that are widely understood to be 
captured.  But GAO is typically called into play at the request of 
congressional committees or subcommittees.21  That puts GAO at the mercy 
of those very members of Congress who may participate in the capture 
dynamic.  More significantly, because it is a congressional agency and was 
established to serve Congress, GAO might understandably be reluctant to 
scrutinize the legislative influence that private groups wield.22  Overlooking 
that influence, however, would miss an important piece of the puzzle. 
For their part, inspectors general (IGs) have brought to light several of 
the most egregious examples of agency capture.  Even before the Deepwater 
Horizon spill, for example, reports from the Interior Department’s IG 
detailed inappropriate contacts between employees at the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) and representatives of the oil industry.23  
 
19. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 
THEY DO IT 31 (1989) (“In the United States, high-level government executives are preoccupied 
with maintaining their agencies in a complex, conflict-ridden, and unpredictable political 
environment, and middle-level government managers are immersed in the effort to cope with the 
myriad constraints that this environment has imposed on their agencies.”). 
20. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-147, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
COMMISSION: BETTER DATA NEEDED TO HELP IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE POTENTIAL HAZARDS 22 
(1997) (reporting that data collected by the CPSC is “generally insufficient to support thorough and 
detailed analysis”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-803, CONSUMER SAFETY: 
BETTER INFORMATION AND PLANNING WOULD STRENGTHEN CPSC’S OVERSIGHT OF IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS 13 (2009) (finding that “CPSC’s authorities have the potential to be effective,” but that 
“implementation is limited by competing priorities and resource and practical constraints”). 
21. About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (2010), 
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html. 
22. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728 (1986) (observing that the Comptroller 
General, who heads GAO, is removable by Congress “‘at any time’” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) 
(1982))). 
23. Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 2008, at A1; Noelle Straub, Interior Probe Finds Fraternizing, Porn and Drugs at MMS Office 
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Reports from the IG at the SEC have likewise generated scrutiny over the 
revolving door between industry and the agency.24 
IGs have three enormous advantages in identifying capture.  First, they 
are fiercely independent and are unlikely to be tainted by capture pathologies 
that might affect their parent agencies.25  Second, IGs have virtually 
unlimited access to both the documents and personnel of the agencies that 
they oversee.26  And third, IGs work within the agency, giving them the 
opportunity to develop a context-rich understanding of agency operations and 
the regulatory environment.27  Without that kind of contextual knowledge, an 
investigator would have a hard time judging when regulators are shirking 
their duties at the behest of regulated entities. 
But IGs are principally reactive, not proactive, agencies, and are 
concerned more with monitoring compliance than enhancing performance.28  
Indeed, their principal charge is to identify fraud, waste, and abuse29—not to 
undertake the more taxing inquiry into whether the influence of regulated 
entities has shaped regulatory outputs in a manner inimical to the agency’s 
mission.  In addition, the IGs’ narrow focus on their parent agencies 
discourages broader inquiries into the various means by which industry 
groups bring pressure to bear on those elected officials with authority over 
the agency. 
A better solution would be to designate a separate investigative body, 
housed within the Executive Branch, to police the federal regulatory 
bureaucracy—including the independent agencies—for symptoms of capture.  
With a possible caveat I explore below, its role would be to monitor and 
 
in La., N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/25/25greenwire-
interior-probe-finds-fraternizing-porn-and-dru-45260.html?emc=eta1. 
24. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: OCTOBER 1, 2009–MARCH 31, 2010, at 55 (2010) (finding an apparent violation of 
ethics rules prohibiting former government employees from “working on matters in which that 
individual participated as a government employee”); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., CASE NO. OIG-526, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS 
REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 28 (2010) [hereinafter 
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO STANFORD’S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME] (same). 
25. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(a) (2006) (providing that IGs at 
cabinet-level agencies “shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and 
demonstrated ability”). 
26. See id. § 6(a)–(b) (providing IGs with broad access to records and mandating investigatory 
assistance from agency heads). 
27. See id. § 6(c) (requiring agencies to give IGs office space within “central and field office 
locations”). 
28.  See PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE 
SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 16 (1993) (noting that IGs have become “instruments of 
retrospective, or backward-looking, compliance rather than catalysts for either performance 
incentives or capacity building”). 
29. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2(2); see also LIGHT, supra note 28, at 40 
(calling “fraud, waste, and abuse” the “three horsemen” of the IG concept). 
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report, not to act or implement.30  The idea would be to capitalize on the 
doggedness with which single-mission agencies tend to pursue their 
regulatory goals and to develop concentrated expertise on the slippery 
concept of capture.  The agency’s relative independence from Congress 
would give it a distinct advantage over GAO.  And the body’s commitment 
to addressing an endemic but subtle problem would be a marked 
improvement over generalist IGs that focus on fraud and abuse. 
What precisely would the body be looking for?  Given the various tools 
that regulated entities have at their disposal to pressure an agency, the body’s 
charge would have to be both broad and open-ended.  At any given agency, 
the body might examine agency–industry contacts, communications between 
the agency and individual congressmen, or political contributions flowing 
from regulated entities to members of the subcommittee charged with 
overseeing the agency.31  It might solicit the unvarnished views of civil 
servants about whether appointed officials thwarted the agency’s mission by 
systematically deferring to the interests of regulated groups.32  It might probe 
whether agency officials exchanged regulatory favors for promises of future 
employment.33  It might examine enforcement patterns and investigate 
whether and why the agency declined to press certain types of actions.34  In 
short, the investigatory body would seek to understand the constraints under 
which the agency operated and make a judgment about the degree to which 
those constraints arose as the result of untoward pressure from regulated 
entities. 
With a mandate this broad, the central challenge for this new 
organization—a sort of centralized public advocate designed solely to probe 
capture pathologies35—involves staffing.  On the input side of the ledger, 
identifying capture requires a thorough investigation not different in kind 
from a criminal or civil probe.  Agency officials will have to be interviewed; 
 
30. Cf. LIGHT, supra note 28, at 16 (noting that IGs “are to look, not act; recommend, not 
implement”). 
31. See Eric Lipton, 3 Congressmen May Face Further Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at 
A13 (reporting on lawmakers who held fund-raising events with lobbyists and executives of 
financial firms “just days before they voted on financial regulatory legislation last year”). 
32. See H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., MAJORITY STAFF 
REP.: FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES 4 (2008) (noting that 
FDA “ignored the warnings from FDA scientists and career officials” that a generous policy toward 
pharmaceuticals “was based on erroneous assertions”). 
33. See Leslie Wayne, Ex-Pentagon Official Gets 9 Months for Conspiring to Favor Boeing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at C1 (reporting the admission of a former Air Force procurement official 
that a military contractor “would not have been selected for some military projects or would have 
received lower payments if not for her efforts to obtain jobs for herself, her daughter and her son-in-
law”). 
34. See INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO STANFORD’S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME, 
supra note 24, at 17 (critiquing the SEC practice of prosecuting easy cases to inflate “stats” and 
ignoring complex, but more serious, frauds). 
35. See Barkow, supra note 1, at 62–64 (discussing public advocates). 
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emails will have to be read; money will have to be tracked.  The core of the 
agency would therefore be made up by seasoned investigators, preferably 
those with experience at offices of the inspector general or investigating 
white-collar crime.  On the output side, officials with expertise in regulatory 
enforcement and lawyers who understand the relevant legal context will have 
to review agency decisions to discern whether poor performance is the result 
of outside pressure. 
Even staffed by crack investigators and top-flight experts on 
bureaucracy, however, this new agency would still lack familiarity with the 
complexities of most regulatory environments.  Without experts in finance, 
for example, the agency could not exercise meaningful oversight of the SEC 
or of the banking agencies.  But where developing in-house expertise would 
be expensive and cumbersome, the new body would not work alone.  It 
would instead coordinate closely with IGs, particularly when pursuing claims 
that individual agency employees had been corrupted by regulated interests.  
The body’s insistent focus on agency capture might even prompt IGs to 
pursue allegations of untoward influence with more vigor—to “pick up their 
socks,” as Senator Whitehouse put it during a recent hearing on capture.36  
The new body should also be empowered to select agency employees for 
temporary details to educate the body’s permanent staff about the agency’s 
operations and to aid in investigations.37 
Although there are several risks to this approach, they are modest.  First, 
a body that is exquisitely attuned to capture might too readily diagnose it.  To 
a hammer, everything looks like a nail.  And if innocuous contact with 
regulated entities could lead to a charge of capture, agencies might decide it’s 
not worth the risk.  That would be unfortunate.  Without open 
communication with their regulated entities, agencies cannot reliably secure 
the information and cooperation they need to regulate effectively.  But while 
this is a real concern, I think it is unduly pessimistic.  An agency devoted to 
eliminating the very real problem of capture is likely to have a robust sense 
of what capture is—and is not.  There is no particular reason to think that it 
will systematically pillory agencies for their contacts with regulated entities 
absent evidence that those contacts are distorting the agency’s mission. 
Second, what’s to stop this new body from itself being captured?  Here 
the answer is straightforward.  Because the new body would monitor 
agencies that themselves regulate thousands upon thousands of different 
 
36. Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th 
Cong. (2010) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse), webcast available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4746 (statement at 93:30). 
37. See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 125(d)(3), 122 Stat. 3765, 3793 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5233) (permitting agencies to “detail, 
on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the [congressional] 
Oversight Panel to assist it in carrying out its duties under this Act”). 
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entities in wide-ranging industries, it would be difficult for a single interest 
group to dominate the agency.38  In addition, agencies assigned narrow tasks 
appear to resist organized pressure more effectively than agencies that have 
conflicting responsibilities.39  Certain subagencies within the Department of 
the Interior, for example, have been plagued by capture in part because they 
are charged both with promoting development and with protecting the 
environment.40  The agency must prioritize one task at the expense of the 
other, meaning that industry-group pressure can easily cement an agency’s 
preference for the task that favors industry.41  That would not be a problem 
for a new body charged with monitoring for capture—especially given that 
such an agency is likely to take a rather dim view of organized efforts to 
subvert its mission. 
Third, funding this sort of body would cost real money.  The new 
agency would have to hire investigators, regulatory specialists, and 
lawyers—and a good number of them.  There would be additional costs 
associated with the diversion of the time and energy of agency officials who 
must cooperate with ongoing investigations.  Again, however, these concerns 
are modest.  If agency capture is a widespread and destructive feature of the 
regulatory state, then it seems worthwhile, all else being equal, to devote a 
trivial share of the federal budget to this sort of hygienic oversight. 
II. Political Will 
But will an investigatory body actually do much to fix capture?  It’s no 
secret (as Barkow points out) that the hapless Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) has been captured.42  But while Congress has tinkered 
at the margins of the CPSC’s statutory authority,43 it hasn’t undertaken 
anything remotely resembling the structural overhaul that the agency so 
 
38. Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1148–50 (1990) (explaining that capture is less likely to take hold at bodies 
beholden to diverse interest groups). 
39. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-
Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
40. See id. at 3 (“[F]ederal public land management agencies have been accused of 
systematically privileging one or more of their goals—often related to economic development—
over others—often related to environmental protection.”). 
41. Matthew 6:24 (King James) (“No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, 
and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.”). 
42. Barkow, supra note 1, at 65–72. 
43. Congress recently enacted a reform bill in response to the public outcry over lead paint in 
children’s toys.  Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, § 101, 
122 Stat. 3016, 3017 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 1278a). The early returns suggest that the 
legislation has fallen short of revitalizing the agency.  See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Toy Makers Fight 
for Exemption from Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at A1 (noting that CSPC commissioners 
have failed on three separate occasions to reach an agreement on the definition of “children’s 
product”). 
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desperately needs.  The point illustrates an unfortunate fact: it’s not enough 
to know that an agency is too solicitous of the entities that it regulates.  The 
political branches, operating in a toxic political environment dominated by 
groups with vested interests in the poor performance of the agency, must also 
muster the political will to do something about it. 
Several possible means suggest themselves for encouraging Congress or 
the Executive Branch to respond to confirmed and specific reports of agency 
capture.  As an initial matter, reports are not all created equal.  Although 
most are ignored, some are bestsellers.44  The credibility of the source makes 
an enormous difference.  Placing the capture oversight body within the White 
House (probably within the Office of Management and Budget) would confer 
upon it enormous credibility.  A scathing and persuasive White House report 
documenting the existence of a captured agency is likely to attract substantial 
media attention and would be relatively hard to ignore.  As Barkow notes in a 
related context, giving an agency “the power to generate and disseminate 
information that can sway votes can go a long way” toward overcoming 
public apathy and encouraging reform.45 
The key here is leveraging the source of the information to draw public 
attention.  Placing the new body within the White House would likely give 
its recommendations the most heft.  The choice, however, is not without risk: 
the President, who is himself sometimes beholden to well-heeled interest 
groups,46 could derail investigations into agencies that have cozy 
relationships with those favored groups.  This would be of particular concern 
in an administration that disliked the congressionally assigned missions of 
various federal agencies and therefore aimed to enhance their attentiveness to 
regulated entities at the expense of their regulatory goals.47  But this risk 
largely dissipates upon closer review.  A hostile administration is unlikely to 
attend to the recommendations of a capture czar, wherever it’s located and 
however it’s designed.  A capture-oriented agency can at most prompt action 
from politicians willing in principle to take its concerns seriously.  It cannot 
and should not be expected to overcome a profound aversion to its mission. 
In any event, alternative placements are less appealing.  Housing the 
body within the Department of Justice might distance it from the President 
somewhat, but such a placement might also put the Department in an 
awkward position with agencies that it regularly represents as clients—a 
concern that would be particularly salient if reports about agency capture 
form the backdrop to litigation challenging agency action.  Making it a 
 
44. E.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT (2004). 
45. Barkow, supra note 1, at 59. 
46. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1305–06. 
47. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 8, at 346 (observing that during the early 1980s, 
“EPA was not so much captured by industry as donated to it by the Reagan administration”). 
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congressional agency would, as with GAO, compromise its ability to identify 
capture dynamics that depend in part on the participation of legislators.  And 
establishing the body as a new independent agency risks consigning it to 
regulatory backwaters along with the CPSC.48  Lacking the stature of the 
SEC or the Fed, much less a natural constituency, an independent capture 
czar is unlikely to attract the public notice necessary to provoke a political 
response to documented reports of capture. 
Locating the office within the White House would also make its 
recommendations more difficult for the President to ignore.  This is 
significant.  Even without congressional cooperation, the Executive Branch 
can take immediate and dramatic steps to short-circuit a capture dynamic.  
There are the obvious tools.  The President could lean on an agency’s 
political leadership, who, given the relatively short time they might expect to 
head the agency, might have preferred to devote their energies elsewhere; 
demand the documentation and disclosure of industry–agency relationships; 
install internal review mechanisms; and monitor agency performance more 
closely. 
But the Executive Branch will also in many cases have the authority to 
overhaul the very structure of the agency, perhaps embedding within it some 
of the structural reforms that Barkow advocates.  Shortly after the Deepwater 
Horizon spill, for example, the Obama Administration split MMS into three 
separate agencies, each with a single, clearly defined mission, in part to 
address concerns relating to capture.49  The Administration found legal 
authority for this move in a 1950 reorganization plan, approved by Congress, 
that transferred to the Secretary of the Interior the authority of his 
subordinates and permitted the Secretary to “authoriz[e] the performance by 
any other officer . . . of the Department of the Interior of any function of the 
Secretary.”50  Similar statutes apply to the Commerce Department,51 the 
Labor Department,52 the Federal Trade Commission,53 the Securities and 
Exchange Commission,54 the Department of Homeland Security,55 the 
Treasury Department,56 and (in varying degrees) most federal agencies.  The 
fact that the President retains this sort of structural control over much of the 
 
48. Cf. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 282–
87 (1955) (documenting capture at independent agencies). 
49. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3299 (2010). 
50. 5 U.S.C. app. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950 § 2 (2006). 
51. 5 U.S.C. app. Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1950 § 2 (2006). 
52. 5 U.S.C. app. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950 § 2 (2006). 
53. 5 U.S.C. app. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950 § 2 (2006). 
54. 5 U.S.C. app. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950 § 2 (2006). 
55. 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(3), (b)(1) (2006). 
56. 31 U.S.C. § 321(b)(2), (c) (2006) (but declining to vest in the Secretary the duties of 
administrative law judges, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the now-defunct Office of Thrift 
Supervision). 
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federal bureaucracy means that he would own the problem—and could not 
readily disclaim responsibility for addressing it. 
To raise the visibility of the new body, Congress could establish 
procedural rules requiring congressional committees to hold public hearings 
on any report documenting capture at a federal agency.  Congress does this 
from time to time.  A 1991 immigration statute, for example, provides that 
the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee “shall hold a hearing 
respecting [a particular] report” submitted by the Comptroller General.57  A 
similar approach could be employed here: the Senate Judiciary Committee or 
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (or 
subcommittees thereof) could be instructed to hold public hearings 
“respecting the reports” issued by the new body within a set period of time 
and even report to the full Congress with the committee’s 
recommendations.58  In a similar vein, Congress could require the Executive 
Branch to detail how it intends to address concerns raised by the new entity, 
much as agency heads already respond to GAO and IG reports upon their 
issuance. 
Should a purely hortatory body’s efforts prove inadequate, however, it 
might be worth exploring alternative means for shifting the presumption 
toward action rather than inaction.  One provocative idea would be for 
Congress to require the Executive Branch to implement any proposals from 
the new body (at least those that don’t require new spending) unless 
Congress formally objects—even if those proposals diverge from prior 
legislation.  This is not unprecedented.  In the recent health-care reform 
legislation, for example, Congress established an independent commission to 
issue legislative proposals for reducing Medicare payment rates.59  If 
Congress fails to enact a competing proposal that reduces Medicare spending 
to the same degree, or if the President vetoes the bill that Congress enacts, 
then the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services must 
implement the commission’s proposal “[n]otwithstanding any other provision 
of law.”60  A similar approach could be employed to address capture.  Having 
identified a capture dynamic, the new body would draft concrete proposals 
 
57. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-232, § 202(b)(2), 105 Stat. 1733, 1737 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note). 
58. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-747, pt. 1, at 3 (1988) (reporting favorably on amendments 
requiring hearings on an agency report and providing that the relevant Senate committee “shall issue 
a report not later than 270 days after that date which describes the findings and recommendations of 
the committee regarding . . . appropriate action”). 
59. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3403(a), 124 Stat. 119, 
489 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk); cf. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 
102(c)(1), 119 Stat. 231, 306 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note) (authorizing the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, in his “sole discretion,” to “waive all legal requirements” 
pertaining to the border fence “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law”). 
60. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3403(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 499. 
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that would automatically go into effect within a set period.  Congress would 
of course have a chance to weigh in on the matter.  But the presumption 
would be reform, and voting to upend that presumption and perpetuate a 
capture dynamic could exact a stiff political price. 
This muscular approach would confer enormous power on the new 
body, perhaps even to the point of provoking a serious nondelegation 
challenge.61  And it would also change the nature of the agency, requiring it 
to supplement its investigative role with the quasi-legislative task of drafting 
proposals to eliminate capture.  Taking such a step before learning more 
about how the political branches respond to a purely investigatory body’s 
reports is probably too hasty.  But if capture remains an intractable problem, 
it would be worth considering alternatives that put a heavy thumb on the 
scales in favor of reform. 
* * * 
 As I explained at the outset, the key to preventing capture is 
structuring agencies so that it does not take hold in the first place.  On that 
front, Barkow’s piece offers a much-needed guide for Congress when it 
seeks to insulate federal agencies from interest-group pressures.  But we 
must be realistic.  Legislative opportunities to overhaul existing agencies will 
be few and far between.  In the meantime, installing a body within the White 
House to monitor for capture and to suggest means for addressing it would 
go far towards preventing regulated entities from co-opting their regulators.  
This sort of day-to-day agency hygiene would hardly be a complete solution, 
and it would by no means substitute for properly structuring an agency in the 
first place.  But it would be a start. 
 
61. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) 
(observing that “the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and 
counting)”). 
